The New York Rosario Rule Applied to Computerized Documents: The Rigid and Impractical Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine Requires Modification by Bandler, John T.
Pace Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Spring 2002 Article 6
April 2002
The New York Rosario Rule Applied to
Computerized Documents: The Rigid and
Impractical Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine
Requires Modification
John T. Bandler
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
John T. Bandler, The New York Rosario Rule Applied to Computerized Documents: The Rigid and
Impractical Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine Requires Modification, 22 Pace L. Rev. 407 (2002)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/6
Comment
The New York Rosario Rule Applied to
Computerized Documents: The Rigid and
Impractical Duplicative Equivalent
Doctrine Requires Modification
John T. Bandler*
Table of Contents
PART I: INTRODUCTION ............................. 410
PART II: BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION .......... 411
A. Overview and History of New York's
Rosario Rule ............................... 411
1. Major Cases and Statutes Regarding the
Rosario Rule ............................ 411
2. Summary of Critical Rosario Concepts .. 419
3. Possible Effects of the Changed
Standard of Review for Rosario
Violations ............................... 421
a. Effect of Criminal Procedure Law
Section 240.75 upon the Scope of
Statements that Constitute Rosario
M aterial .............................. 421
b. Potential Effect of Criminal Procedure
Law Section 240.75 upon the Analysis
of Rosario Violations ................. 422
* The author served as a police officer in the New York State Police from 1994
to 2002, holding the rank of Trooper. He is currently an Assistant District Attor-
ney for the New York County District Attorney's Office. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author and are not intended to reflect views of the
New York State Police.
407
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
PART III:
B. Computers and New Technology Create
New Issues Regarding what Constitutes
Rosario M aterial ...........................
1. Introduction to Computer (Electronic)
D ocum ents ..............................
a. Computer Documents Create New
Rosario Issues ........................
b. The "Recorded" Requirement .........
c. Computer Documents Defined ........
d. Computer Documents and Data
Storage ...............................
e. Types of Computer Data ..............
2. Computer Documents and the
Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine .........
3. New Technology Brings New Forms of
Recorded Statements ....................
C. New York Case Law Regarding Computer-
Related Witness Statements ................
1. The Current New York Duplicative
Equivalent Doctrine is a Significant
Barrier to a Rational Consideration of
Computer Documents Under Rosario ....
2. New York Case Law Directly Addressing
Computer-Related Witness Statements...
D. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions
Regarding Computer-Related Witness
Statem ents .................................
PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR COURTS
REGARDING COMPUTER-RELATED
ROSARIO ISSUES ............................
A. Initial Findings ............................
1. "Recording" Occurs upon Keystroke ......
2. Computer Documents are Almost Always
E d ited ...................................
3. Police Should Only be Required to
Manually Preserve Document Versions
B. The Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine Must
be M odified ................................
424
424
424
425
425
426
426
427
432
433
433
437
441
443
443
444
445
445
446
408 [Vol. 22:407
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/6
THE NEW YORK ROSARIO RULE
PART IV:
1. The Court of Appeals Must Modify the
Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine for
Computer Recorded Statements ......... 446
2. It Would Be Illogical To Have Separate
Standards For Computer Documents and
Traditional Documents .................. 447
3. Proposed Modifications of the
Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine for All
Rosario M aterial ........................ 447
a. Create a Work-in-Progress
Exemption ............................ 447
b. Allow Consideration of Witness
Testimony with Respect to Lost or
Destroyed Recorded Statements ....... 448
c. Continue to Allow Cross-Examination
Regarding Changes Made to
Documents ............................ 448
d. Continue to Allow Adverse Inference
Instructions, but Only upon a Finding
of a Rosario Violation ................ 449
C. Defendants Should Not Be Allowed to
Conduct Any Discovery of Police or
Prosecution Storage Devices ................ 450
D. Proposed Rules Regarding Rosario
M aterial ................................... 451
1. Adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 as
the Definition of Writing and Recording. 451
2. Create a New Definition of the
Duplicative Equivalent .................. 452
3. Allow Prosecution Witness Testimony
Regarding Lost or Destroyed Rosario
M aterial ................................ 453
E. The Rosario Rule and Future Police
Technology ................................. 453
CONCLUSION ................................ 454
2002] 409
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
I. Introduction
In People v. Rosario,' the New York Court of Appeals 2 set
forth what has become known as the "Rosario rule." This rule
mandates that in criminal prosecutions, the prosecution must
disclose to the defense all of a prosecution witness' prior re-
corded statements so long as they are material to that witness'
testimony.3 Such recorded statements are commonly referred
to as "Rosario materials," and may include the witness' prior
testimony, written statements, notes, and reports.4 The pur-
pose of the Rosario rule is to ensure that the defense can ade-
quately test the credibility of prosecution witnesses during
cross-examination. 5 The Rosario rule was subsequently codified
in the New York Criminal Procedure Law ("C.P.L.") in 1980 and
its importance has been consistently emphasized by the New
York Court of Appeals. 6
To date, the New York courts and legislature have largely
ignored new technology such as word processors, computer doc-
uments, email, voice mail, personal digital assistants ("PDAs"),
and in-car cameras that are supplementing or replacing the use
of pens, paper, and typewriters, and creating new Rosario is-
sues. As a result of such technology, more prior recorded state-
ments exist now than ever before. This new technology requires
that courts re-examine what types of statements are classified
as a witness' prior recorded statements. For example, when a
document is created and edited on a computer, it is unclear
what text editing should be preserved as Rosario material for
defense inspection.
1. 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1961).
2. The New York Court of Appeals is New York State's highest court.
3. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 883.
4. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1) (McKinney 1993) (discoverable mate-
rial includes any written or recorded statement, including grand jury testimony);
People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967, 968-69 (N.Y. 1995) (Rosario material in-
cludes a police officer's notes and reports).
5. See Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 883. The Rosario holding was modeled after the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957). The Jencks rule is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2001), commonly known as
the Jencks Act.
6. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45; see, e.g., People v. Joseph, 658 N.E.2d
996 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Young, 591 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 1992); People v.
Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1986).
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Part II of this comment provides a thorough background of
the Rosario line of cases, a background and discussion regard-
ing how computers and new technology create new issues re-
garding Rosario material, and an examination of cases in New
York and other jurisdictions related to Rosario material and
computer technology. Part III proposes several standards that
should be used when dealing with computer-related Rosario
material, and proposes a significant change in the current du-
plicative equivalent doctrine, a change that extends to all Rosa-
rio material. Part III also provides a sample adverse inference
instruction to be used when Rosario requirements have been vi-
olated, and explains why defense requests to inspect the com-
puter media of police and prosecutors must be denied. These
proposals reflect an attempt to balance the policy considera-
tions of the Rosario rule, the rights of defendants, and the need
to have realistic, workable, and efficient standards. Part IV
concludes that the current duplicative equivalent doctrine must
be modified through either judicial or legislative action.
II. Background and Discussion
A. Overview and History of New York's Rosario Rule
1. Major Cases and Statutes Regarding the Rosario Rule
Rosario case law has focused on two major issues: (1) what
constitutes Rosario material, and thus what constitutes a Rosa-
rio violation; and (2) the appropriate penalty for Rosario viola-
tions. 7 This section summarizes the history of the Rosario rule
and the major developments that have followed the rule's
creation.
In 1933, the New York Court of Appeals held in People v.
Walsh8 that the trial court may determine which prior state-
ments of a witness were relevant to the defendant's case and
therefore had to be turned over to the defense. 9 Under this
7. New York is unique among jurisdictions for creating a special standard of
review and penalty for Rosario violations. See People v. Jones, 517 N.E.2d 865,
870 (N.Y. 1961) (Bellacosa, J., concurring). Thus, courts in other jurisdictions do
not deal with this second issue, and instead apply ordinary standards of appellate
review (ordinary harmless error analysis).
8. 186 N.E. 422 (N.Y. 1933), overruled in part by People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d
881 (N.Y. 1961).
9. See Walsh, 186 N.E. at 425.
2002] 411
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holding, the trial court allowed the defense counsel to see only
those statements of a witness that the court deemed relevant
and contradictory to the witness' testimony, and that were not
privileged.' 0
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court held in Jencks v.
United States that, in federal criminal cases, the defense has a
right to inspect any statement made by a government witness
bearing on the subject matter of his or her testimony." The Su-
preme Court's supervisory power over the federal courts pro-
vided the authority for this rule, and thus it was not a
constitutional rule.12 The same year, Congress adopted the
holding of Jencks by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3500.13
In 1961, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Rosa-
rio adopted the holding of Jencks.14 The court held that the de-
fense counsel was allowed to examine for itself a witness' prior
statement, regardless of whether it varied from the witness'
trial testimony, as long as the prior statement related to the
subject matter of the witness' testimony and contained nothing
that was required to be kept confidential. 15 The court reasoned
that the "single-minded counsel for the accused . . . is in a far
better position to appraise the value of a witness' pretrial state-
ments for impeachment purposes." 16 Thus, New York State's
Rosario rule was born. The court maintained that this holding
was based upon "policy considerations" and a "right sense ofjus-
tice," rather than the state or federal constitutions or state
law. 17 Four years later, the court of appeals held that the Rosa-
rio rule extended to pretrial hearings.'8 The C.P.L. was subse-
10. See id.
11. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957).
12. See id. at 668 (stating that the basis for holding the Court's "standards for
the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts"); see also United States
v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) ("[O]ur Jencks decision and the Jencks Act
were not cast in constitutional terms.").
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2001); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
14. See Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 883.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See id. Other cases have stated specifically that Rosario was not constitu-
tionally based. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 585 N.E.2d 795, 799 (N.Y. 1991).
18. See People v. Malinsky, 209 N.E.2d 694, 697 (N.Y. 1965).
[Vol. 22:407412
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quently amended to reflect these decisions. 19 At this time,
Rosario violations were reviewed under ordinary harmless error
analysis, 20 although this would change eventually. 21
The New York Court of Appeals started down a slippery
path in People v. Kass2 2 when it held that a witness' destruction
of notes that had been recopied could constitute a Rosario viola-
tion. 23 The court reasoned that the defense had not been in-
formed of the destruction of the notes until after the trial, and
thus were denied the opportunity to cross-examine and test the
credibility of the police witness regarding the circumstances of
the destruction.24
In People v. Consolazio,25 the court of appeals established a
narrow "duplicative equivalent" exception for Rosario mate-
rial.26 The court held that it was not an error for the prosecu-
19. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 240.45 (McKinney 1993) (discovery of wit-
ness' statements upon trial); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.44 (McKinney 1993) (dis-
covery of witness' statements upon pretrial hearing). Section 240.45(1) provides in
part:
After the jury has been sworn and before the prosecutor's opening address,
or in the case of a single judge trial after commencement and before submis-
sion of evidence, the prosecutor shall, subject to a protective order, make
available to the defendant: (a) Any written or recorded statement, including
any testimony before a grand jury and an examination videotaped pursuant
to section 190.32 of this chapter, made by a person whom the prosecutor
intends to call as a witness at trial, and which relates to the subject matter
of the witness's testimony.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 240.45. Section 240.44 reads in part:
Subject to a protective order, at a pre-trial hearing held in a criminal court
at which a witness is called to testify, each party, at the conclusion of the
direct examination of each of its witnesses, shall, upon request of the other
party, make available to that party to the extent not previously disclosed: 1.
Any written or recorded statement, including any testimony before a grand
jury, made by such witness other than the defendant which relates to the
subject matter of the witness's testimony.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.44.
20. See Rosario, 173 N.E.2d at 884. For example, even though the appellate
court in Rosario found that the trial court's ruling was erroneous because the trial
court judge did not turn over the witness' statements to the defense, the court
found this error was harmless and affirmed the conviction. See id.
21. See People v. Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1986).
22. 250 N.E.2d 219 (N.Y. 1969).
23. See id. at 221-22.
24. Id.
25. 354 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1976).
26. See id. at 806. I also refer to the duplicative equivalent exception as the
"duplicative equivalent doctrine."
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tion to fail to disclose prior statements of a witness so long as
duplicate equivalents of the statements had been disclosed. 27
The court also held that a Rosario violation could never be
deemed a harmless error, 28 setting the stage for what would be-
come known as the "Ranghelle rule."29
In People v. Poole,30 the court held that a prosecutor's prof-
fer that all Rosario material has been disclosed to the defense is
generally sufficient to determine that no additional Rosario ma-
terial exists. 31 However, the court also stated that if the de-
fense can articulate a factual basis that such material does
exist, an in camera review of the prosecution's file may be
warranted. 32
An important corollary of the Rosario rule was established
in People v. Kelly.33 In Kelly, the court held, "A necessary corol-
lary of the duty to disclose evidence is the obligation to preserve
the evidence until a request for disclosure is made. Any other
rule would facilitate evasion of the disclosure requirements. '34
Although this holding related to physical evidence, it has been
applied consistently to Rosario material.35
In a 1986 decision, the New York Court of Appeals an-
nounced what would become known as the "Ranghelle rule."36
The court held that when the prosecution fails to produce Rosa-
rio material completely, such failure constitutes a per se error,
requiring reversal and a new trial, immaterial of the prosecu-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 805 ("We thus reject arguments that consideration of the signifi-
cance of the content or substance of a witness' prior statements can result in a
finding of harmless error.").
29. See People v. Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1989).
30. 397 N.E.2d 697 (N.Y. 1979).
31. Id. at 700. Such an exception to the Rosario rule has been described by
the court of appeals as a "commonsense limit[ I to mandatory disclosure."
Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d at 1015.
32. Poole, 397 N.E.2d at 700.
33. 467 N.E.2d 498 (N.Y. 1984).
34. Id. at 500 (citations omitted).
35. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 524 N.E.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. 1988) ("Just as the
People have a duty to produce Rosario material they also have a correlative 'obliga-
tion to preserve evidence until a request for disclosure is made."' (quoting Kelly,
467 N.E.2d at 500) (citations omitted)).
36. See People v. Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1961).
[Vol. 22:407414
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tion's good faith efforts. 37 The court also addressed the duplica-
tive equivalent doctrine, holding that even "minor"
inconsistencies between an officer's memo books and incident
reports meant that the statements contained therein could not
be considered duplicative equivalents.38
In People v. Jones,3 9 the court reaffirmed the per se reversal
rule of Ranghelle in circumstances in which the prosecution
fails to turn over Rosario material.40 Although concurring in
the decision, Judge Bellacosa strongly disagreed with the per se
reversal standard applied by the court, and stated: "The new
per se error rule has elevated the consequences of these noncon-
stitutional Rosario violations to a level higher than a host of
constitutional errors to which harmless error analysis ap-
plies .... As the People observe in their brief, no other jurisdic-
tion has a Ranghelle-type rule."41 Judge Bellacosa opined that
the Ranghelle rule was contrary to legislative direction con-
tained in the C.P.L.42 He cautioned that the rule constituted a
37. See id. at 1016 ("The People's good faith in attempting to obtain the report
is irrelevant ...."). In a later decision the court affirmed the application of the
Ranghelle rule to direct appeals, discussed at length the reasons for the Ranghelle
rule, and again emphasized that the Rosario and Ranghelle holdings were not
based upon the state or federal constitutions. See Jackson, 585 N.E.2d at 798-99
("Rosario is not based on the State or Federal Constitution. It is, in essence, a
discovery rule, based on a deeply held belief that simple fairness requires the de-
fendant to be supplied with prosecution reports and statements that could conceiv-
ably aid in the defense's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.").
38. See Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d at 1017; see also id. at 1015 ("Statements are
not the 'duplicative equivalent' of previously produced statements, however, just
because they are 'harmonious' or 'consistent' with them." (citations omitted)).
39. 517 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 1987).
40. See id. at 868. The court stated:
[T]he Consolazio, Perez, and Ranghelle decisions [creating the per se rever-
sal standard] are consistent with prior case law and are part of this court's
efforts at careful development of a State standard which, while fair to the
prosecution, accords to the defendant a degree of protection commensurate
with the importance of Rosario rights.
Id. (citation omitted). The court emphasized that Rosario violations are unlike
other violations in which harmless error analysis is appropriate. See id. at 868-69.
41. Id. at 870 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 871 ("This relatively new absolute rule even blinks the legislative
direction contained in CPL 470.05(1)... that '[ain appellate court must determine
an appeal without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.'") (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 470.05(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1994)).
9
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"law enforcer's nightmare and a perpetrator's delight," and ad-
vocated legislative action to change the Ranghelle rule.43
Three categories of Rosario violations, and the remedies for
each, were enumerated by the court of appeals in People v. Mar-
tinez.44 The first category exists when the prosecution delays in
disclosing Rosario material.45 The court held that in these in-
stances the trial court should determine whether the defense
was substantially prejudiced by the delay.46 The second cate-
gory involves the prosecution's complete failure to disclose Ro-
sario material even though the prosecution continued to possess
the material.47 The court held that such a failure constitutes
"per se reversible error requiring a new trial preceded by disclo-
sure of the material."48 The third category is when Rosario evi-
dence has been lost or destroyed and cannot be produced by the
prosecution.49 The court held that in these circumstances:
43. See id. at 872. Judge Bellacosa stated:
The new per se error rule unavoidably plants an uncertainty into every tried
criminal case. It is a law enforcer's nightmare and a perpetrator's delight.
Insofar as the rule is not constitutionally rooted, I believe it would be useful
for the Legislature to consider a specification in CPL 470.05 and article 240,
especially CPL 240.20 and 240.45, overcoming the per se-ness of this exalted
court-made rule.
Jones, 517 N.E.2d at 871-72. Judge Bellacosa has been consistent and outspoken
in his criticism of the Ranghelle rule. See, e.g., People v. Joseph, 658 N.E.2d 996,
1000-05 (N.Y. 1995) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); People v. Banch, 608 N.E.2d 1069,
1078-79 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (quoting his concurrence in Jones
and advocating legislative reform "as an antidote to the spreading threat of the per
se virus"). Judge Levine also criticized the per se reversal rule by joining Judge
Bellacosa's dissent in Joseph. See Joseph, 658 N.E.2d at 1005 ("Disregard of the
trial evidence is the hallmark of this Court's Rosario per se reversal jurispru-
dence." (citations omitted)). Judge Bellacosa's advice was eventually heeded when
C.P.L. § 240.75 was enacted. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.75 (McKinney Supp.
2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2001).
44. 524 N.E.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. 1988).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citations omitted). This second category is, of course, the "Ranghelle
rule." See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
49. Martinez, 524 N.E.2d at 136. This category of destroyed Rosario material
is very important to this comment because computer editing raises the issue of
whether Rosario material is lost or destroyed. See infra Part II.B. In another deci-
sion, the court held that loss or destruction of Rosario material does not automati-
cally require dismissal of the indictment because ordering a new trial will not
restore the lost material. See People v. Haupt, 524 N.E.2d 129, 130 (N.Y. 1988).
Subsequent cases made clear that the court will often grant a new trial for loss or
416
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If the People fail to exercise care to preserve it and defendant is
prejudiced by their mistake, the court must impose an appropri-
ate sanction. The determination of what is appropriate is commit-
ted to the trial court's sound discretion, and while the degree of
prosecutorial fault may be considered, the court's attention should
focus primarily on the overriding need to eliminate prejudice to
the defendant. 50
The following two cases demonstrate the extreme narrow-
ness of the court of appeals' duplicative equivalent doctrine. In
People v. Young,5 1 the court held:
Two documents cannot be "duplicative equivalents" if there are
variations or inconsistencies between them. Further,
"[s]tatements are not the 'duplicative equivalent' of previously
produced statements ... just because they are 'harmonious' or
'consistent' with them." Indeed, a statement that is consistent
with other disclosed material but omits details or facts cannot be
considered the "duplicative equivalent" of the disclosed material,
since omissions often furnish important subjects for cross-
examination. 52
The Young court also stated: "Indeed, this [clourt has already
explicitly rejected the suggestion that reversal should not be re-
quired where the withheld Rosario information was 'of only "de
minimis" or "minimal" value."' 53 In People v. Joseph,54 the court
held:
destruction of Rosario material if the defense was not aware that material had
been lost or destroyed. See Martinez, 524 N.E.2d at 136. The defense is often
deemed to be prejudiced if they were not able to cross-examine the witness regard-
ing the loss or destruction, and often an adverse inference instruction is deemed
warranted. See, e.g., Banch, 608 N.E.2d at 1072; Martinez, 524 N.E.2d at 136.
50. Martinez, 524 N.E.2d at 136. In such situations, an adverse inference in-
struction will generally be required. For example, in Banch, the court stated: "De-
pending upon the degree of prosecutorial fault and the resulting prejudice to the
defendant, the court must then impose an appropriate sanction - preclusion of the
witness' testimony or an adverse inference charge, for example." 608 N.E.2d at
1072 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Banch court also stated, "Where
the People have failed to exercise due care in preserving Rosario material and the
defendant is prejudiced by the loss or destruction, it is an abuse of discretion for
the court to impose no sanction." Id. at 1073 (citation omitted). Arguably, if there
was no prejudice at all to the defendant, then no adverse inference charge should
be required; however, the court of appeals always seems to find some form of
prejudice to the defendant.
51. 591 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 1992).
52. Id. at 1166 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 1167 (citations omitted).
11
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We stated in People v. Ranghelle for example, that "[sitatements
are not the 'duplicative equivalent' of previously produced state-
ments ... just because they are 'harmonious' or 'consistent' with
them." A statement cannot be a "duplicative equivalent" if it con-
tains even minor differences resulting from errors in
transcription....
[A] document that has been lost or destroyed and is therefore
no longer available for judicial inspection cannot be deemed the
"duplicative equivalent" of Rosario material that has previously
been disclosed....
Contrary to the People's contention, a police officer's testimony re-
garding the contents of a lost or destroyed police document is not
an acceptable substitute for the document itself, nor is it a suffi-
cient basis from which the court could infer the requisite duplica-
tive equivalence. Even where a document has purportedly been
transcribed verbatim, inadvertent errors, omissions and deletions
can occur, giving rise to precisely the kind of discrepancies that
are most useful in cross-examination. Since the transcriber is
likely to be unaware of these errors, that individual's testimony
cannot provide the necessary assurance that the two documents
were alike in all respects.
55
Because the court of appeals has explicitly stated that Ro-
sario and Ranghelle were not based on the state or federal con-
stitutions,5 6 the state legislature had the authority to modify or
reject the Ranghelle rule. The legislature did so in June of 2000
when it enacted the Sexual Assault Reform Act.5 7 A portion of
this Act creates section 240.75 of the C.P.L., which rejects the
54. 658 N.E.2d 996 (N.Y. 1995).
55. Id. at 998 (citations omitted). I believe this is another per se rule by the
court-a per se rule that the officer's testimony in these circumstances is inherently
unreliable and thus cannot even be considered by the fact-finder. See infra Part
II.C.1.
56. See Jackson, 585 N.E.2d at 799.
57. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.75. In a press release, the Governor's
office stated:
The bill overturns the Ranghelle Rule to prevent fairly obtained convictions
for serious crimes including murder, rape and robbery from being automati-
cally reversed on mere technicalities without any showing of prejudice.
This historic reform, which has been a top priority for law enforcement offi-
cials for more than 15 years, overturns a decision that imposed an inflexible
rule, adopted by no other state in the nation, that conferred the windfall of
undeserved new trials on countless serious violent criminals, such as mur-
derers and sexual predators.
418 [Vol. 22:407
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/6
THE NEW YORK ROSARIO RULE
Ranghelle rule and requires the appellate court to apply a
prejudice standard of review with respect to alleged Rosario vio-
lations. Section 240.75 provides:
The failure of the prosecutor or any agent of the prosecutor to dis-
close statements that are required to be disclosed under subdivi-
sion one of section 240.44 or paragraph (a) of subdivision one of
section 240.45 of this article shall not constitute grounds for any
court to order a new pre-trial hearing or set aside a conviction, or
reverse, modify or vacate a judgment of conviction in the absence
of a showing by the defendant that there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that the non-disclosure materially contributed to the result of
the trial or other proceeding; provided, however, that nothing in
this section shall affect or limit any right the defendant may have
to a re-opened pre-trial hearing when such statements were dis-
closed before the close of evidence at trial. 58
On its face, section 240.75 affects only the second category
of violations outlined in Martinez, which is the per se reversal
standard that was applied when the prosecution totally failed to
produce Rosario material within its possession. 59 However, the
new law will do more than simply replace a per se reversal stan-
dard with a prejudice standard; it will change the scope and
analysis of Rosario violations. 60
2. Summary of Critical Rosario Concepts
Three Rosario concepts are critical to this comment. First,
the narrow and rigid duplicative equivalent doctrine is more
properly titled the "identical document doctrine."61 Second, al-
though there is a clear duty for the prosecution to preserve Ro-
sario material once it is created, 62 there is no such recognized
Press Release, Governor George E. Pataki, Governor Pataki Signs Landmark Sex-
ual Assault Reform Act (October 19, 2000), http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/
year00/octl9_4_00.htm (on file with author); see also New Law Increases Sentence
for Assault, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 20, 2000, at 4.
58. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.75.
59. See Martinez, 524 N.E.2d at 136.
60. See infra Part II.A.3.
61. The rigid language of Joseph is sufficient to reach this conclusion, which
was also reached by the First Department. See People v. Dowling, 698 N.Y.S.2d
11, 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("[T]wo items are duplicative equivalents only if they
are identical in every detail; it is not enough to show that they are harmonious or
consistent with one another.") (citing Joseph, 658 N.E.2d at 998).
62. See Martinez, 524 N.E.2d at 136; see also Kelly, 467 N.E.2d at 500.
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duty to create Rosario material.63 For example, even if an of-
ficer is required by his department policy to prepare and submit
a report, at least one appellate court has held that there is no
Rosario violation when the officer never creates the report. 64
Third, if a statement is never written or recorded, it cannot con-
stitute Rosario material. 65
These Rosario concepts are becoming increasingly critical
as new technology creates more and more methods of recording
statements. 66 Specifically, computer documents present an is-
sue as to when recording takes place. 67 For example, it is still
undetermined whether statements would be deemed "recorded"
upon keystroke, upon saving, or upon printing.
63. See People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), affd, 595
N.E.2d 845 (N.Y. 1992).
The obligation [to provide Rosario material to the defense] is limited to
'written or recorded' statements. Oral statements are not included and
since, here, there were no written or recorded statements to be disclosed, the
prosecutor did not violate his Rosario obligation .... There is no require-
ment that a prosecutor record in any fashion his interviews with a witness.
Id. at 981; see also People v. Littles, 595 N.Y.S.2d 463, 463-64 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993) ("Because we are satisfied that the material was never generated, there was
in fact no Rosario violation . .. ").
64. Littles, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 463-64 ("[Tlhe People have no affirmative duty to
create such [Rosario] material. Because we are satisfied that the material was
never generated, there was in fact no Rosario violation, and no sanction at trial
was therefore required.").
65. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.44 -.45; see also People v. Barnes, 607
N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that an unrecorded conversation
between witness and Assistant District Attorney was not Rosario material); Lit-
tles, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 463-64; Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 981. Note that sections
240.45 and 240.44 use the language "written or recorded." This may be a redun-
dant legalism, or it may be based upon a belief that Rosario material could be
either written (handwritten, typewritten, etc.) or recorded (onto an audio- or video-
tape, etc). I will use the term "recorded" to encompass anything written or re-
corded and, thus, anything that could be considered Rosario material. For
example, something handwritten or typewritten is "recorded" onto paper. This
convention is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(1), which provides one
definition for "writings and recordings," rather than distinguishing between the
two terms. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).
66. See infra Part II.B.
67. See infra Part II.B. and III.A.
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3. Possible Effects of the Changed Standard of Review
for Rosario Violations
Under the Ranghelle rule, any ambiguity regarding
whether a statement was Rosario material constituted a basis
for automatic reversal if the statement was later deemed to be
Rosario material and had not been disclosed to the defense.68
Section 240.75 of the C.P.L. clearly changes the Ranghelle rule.
It seems that the court of appeals is bound to follow section
240.75,69 which essentially requires the court to apply a
prejudice standard of review for all Rosario violations. 70 The
court could limit the practical effect of the new legislation by
finding prejudice to the defendant for almost all violations, or
by expanding the usual standard of prejudice when dealing
with Rosario violations. 71 However, to continue to hold that a
Rosario violation is per se prejudicial would be contrary to the
plain meaning and intent of section 240.75.72
a. Effect of Criminal Procedure Law Section 240.75
upon the Scope of Statements that Constitute
Rosario Material
A discussion of the types of recorded statements that con-
stitute Rosario material is beyond the scope of this comment.
However, it is worth noting that, under section 240.75, the
68. See Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d at 1016.
69. There is no apparent basis for the Court of Appeals to void the new law
because the court has previously specifically stated that its Rosario line of cases is
not constitutionally based. See Jackson, 585 N.E.2d at 799.
70. Under section 240.75, the standard of review for Rosario violations is
whether non-disclosure "materially contributed to the result" of the trial. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAw § 240.75.
71. For instance, the court has already held that Rosario violations are per se
prejudicial. See Consolazio, 354 N.E.2d at 805.
72. However, it is worth noting that the Ranghelle rule was already arguably
contrary to the plain meaning and intent of the law prior to the enactment of sec-
tion 240.75. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 470.05(1) (appellate court cannot consider
technical errors or defects that do not affect substantial rights); Jackson, 585
N.E.2d at 799 (Rosario line of cases, including the per se reversal rule, is not con-
stitutionally based); Jones, 517 N.E.2d at 871 (Bellacosa, J., concurring)
(Ranghelle rule contradicts section 470.05(1) of the C.P.L.). The court must follow
the statute unless it determines that the statute is unconstitutional. Since the
court specifically stated that the Ranghelle per se reversal rule was not based upon
the state or federal constitutions, it is difficult to ascertain the court's authority to
disregard section 470.05(1) as applied to Rosario issues.
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scope of Rosario material could be expanded by the courts. This
expansion could occur if courts use a two-step analysis: first de-
termining Whether a Rosario violation occurred, and then deter-
mining whether the defendant was prejudiced.73
Consider a case in which it is clear that the defendant com-
mitted the crime of which he was convicted, and there was a
Rosario violation at trial. The judge has concerns about: (1) al-
lowing a guilty person to go free; (2) the rights of future defend-
ants; and (3) police and prosecutorial actions and practices.
Under the old per se reversal rule, the judge would be more
likely to find that the undisclosed material did not constitute
Rosario material (and thus there was no trial error) in order to
affirm the conviction. 74 Under the new prejudice standard, the
judge may be more likely to find that undisclosed material did
constitute Rosario material (and thus there was a trial error),
yet still affirm the conviction on the grounds that the Rosario
violation was harmless. By making such a determination, the
judge could affirm the present conviction and keep the guilty
defendant in jail, but also broaden the scope of discoverable ma-
terial for future defendants.
b. Potential Effect of Criminal Procedure Law
Section 240.75 upon the Analysis of Rosario
Violations
Under the new standard, it is possible that the actual scope
of Rosario material may become more ambiguous, and the con-
sideration of whether the defendant was prejudiced will become
more important. Under section 240.75, the appellate court
might assume for the sake of argument, but not actually decide,
that a Rosario violation occurred. The court could then evalu-
ate the facts of the case and decide that no prejudice resulted to
73. Prior to section 240.75, when an issue was raised on appeal regarding
non-disclosure of Rosario material, the per se reversal rule meant that the appel-
late court only needed to consider whether the non-disclosed material was or was
not Rosario material, since the remedy of reversal was automatic. See Ranghelle,
503 N.E.2d at 1016. On its face, section 240.75 simply adds another step of analy-
sis: a determination of whether the violation materially contributed to the result.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.75.
74. Otherwise, if the judge ruled that the undisclosed material was Rosario
material, reversal of the conviction would be necessary (unless some exception
could be found or created).
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the defendant, even if there was a violation, and affirm the con-
viction. This would give police and prosecutors less guidance
for future procedure.
Another potential effect of section 240.75 is that the analy-
sis of whether a statement is Rosario material could merge into
the analysis of whether "the non-disclosure materially contrib-
uted to the result of the trial or other proceeding." 5 Overtly or
covertly, the judge might consider prejudice when determining
whether or not the statement was Rosario material.
A final possible effect of section 240.75 is that the analysis
of Rosario violations could merge with the materiality analysis
under Brady v. Maryland 6 and People v. Vilardi.7 7 Under
Brady, "the prosecution must disclose to defendant evidence in
its possession that is (1) favorable to the defense and (2) mate-
rial either to guilt or punishment. The failure to do so violates
the constitutional guarantee of due process."78 The Vilardi
court discussed the materiality standard, stating:
[A] showing of a 'reasonable possibility' that the failure to disclose
the exculpatory report contributed to the verdict remains the ap-
propriate standard to measure materiality ....
The "reasonable possibility" standard applied by the Appellate Di-
vision-essentially a reformulation of the "seldom if ever excusa-
ble" rule-is a clear rule that properly encourages compliance with
these obligations .... 79
Similarly, section 240.75 states that the appellate court should
not reverse a conviction based on a Rosario violation unless
there was a "reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure ma-
terially contributed to the result of the trial or other proceed-
ing."80 If section 240.75 and Vilardi use similar, if not identical,
standards, the question is whether there are any statements
that could create an error under Rosario and section 240.75
without creating an error under Vilardi. If there are no state-
ments that fall within this category, a separate analysis under
75. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 240.75.
76. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
77. 555 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1990).
78. Id. at 921 (Simons, J., concurring) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
79. Id. at 920 (citations omitted).
80. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 240.75.
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Rosario serves little purpose. For example, in order for a court
to reverse a conviction for a Rosario violation, it must find there
was a "reasonable possibility" that the non-disclosure materi-
ally contributed to the conviction. With such a finding, the
court has also implicitly found that a Vilardi violation occurred.
Thus, it seems that Rosario violations could be a subgroup of
Vilardi/Brady violations. The important distinction will be that
a prosecutor's disclosure requirement under Rosario only arises
prior to a hearing or trial, and the disclosure requirements
under Vilardi and Brady arise when exculpatory information
becomes available.
B. Computers and New Technology Create New Issues
Regarding What Constitutes Rosario Material
1. Introduction to Computer (Electronic) Documents
a. Computer Documents Create New Rosario Issues
Computer documents differ from typewritten or handwrit-
ten documents because of the editing that inherently occurs on
screen without the document being converted into a printed
form. In a typewritten or handwritten document, edits are visi-
ble to the reader as cross-outs or white-outs. Otherwise, the au-
thor would have to completely rewrite the document and save
the older version as Rosario material.81 In a computer docu-
ment, by contrast, edits are made constantly in the form of
back-spaces, spell-checks, deletions, insertions, and cut-and-
paste operations. Such undocumented edits could lead to a
finding of a Rosario violation, which could require a court
sanction.8 2
81. To be precise, according to the court of appeals' decisions, the older version
should be saved and turned over to the defense in case the court later decides it
was or could have been Rosario material. When a recorded writing is lost or de-
stroyed, the court assumes a Rosario violation has occurred because the court must
be able to inspect a non-disclosed statement in order to determine whether it was a
duplicative equivalent. See Joseph, 658 N.E.2d at 998.
82. A catch-22 of the court of appeals' duplicative equivalent doctrine is that
the defense attorney could cross-examine the officer and ask whether any edits
were made to the document. Once the officer candidly admits that edits were
made and not preserved, he or she has admitted a Rosario violation. The duplica-
tive equivalent exception is not available, and the judge may have to give an ad-
verse inference instruction to the jury regarding the officer's credibility.
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b. The "Recorded" Requirement
As discussed in section A of Part II, if a statement is never
recorded, it cannot constitute Rosario material. Under the view
adopted in this comment, typing keystrokes on a computer in
and of itself constitutes recording because the keystrokes are
being "recorded" through storage in temporary computer mem-
ory as they are displayed on the computer screen. The Federal
Rules of Evidence appear to be consistent with this view.8 3 By
any standard, a document has been recorded when it is saved
onto a disk, or printed onto paper.
c. Computer Documents Defined
Computer documents may also be referred to as "electronic
documents," emphasizing the nature of computer storage me-
dia.8 4 For the purposes of this comment, "computer," "digital,"
and "electronic" are synonymous terms, and there is no distinc-
tion between computer "documents" and "files."8 5 This com-
ment assumes the continuation of paper-based discovery, and
therefore a computer document needs to be printed prior to dis-
covery.86 This comment focuses on word processing documents,
which are documents used to create and edit text. Discussions
of database documents, computer programs, and computer evi-
dence issues are beyond the scope of this comment.
83. See infra Part III.A.1 and FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).
84. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal
Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 333 (2000) ("By
using the modifier 'electronic,' the term incorporates the idea that the 'physical
embodiment of information or ideas' must be kept in electronic form-or ... in the
form of binary numbers stored on electronic transistors.").
85. "In the context of EDMS [Electronic Document Management Systems] ...
a document is essentially a file. A file, in this usage, is an electronic, digital
container for information. A document may be a word processing file, or it may be
a graphic image, or any other discrete, identifiable information unit that can exist
within a computer system." Worldox, The Case for Document Management, at
http://www.worldox.com/atwork/whydms.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002) (on file
with the author).
86. Even though police departments are becoming increasingly computerized,
most still utilize paper-based record systems. A report becomes official when it is
printed onto paper, and submitted for approval and filing. Of course, the mere fact
that a computer document is never printed onto paper should not exclude it from
the reach of the Rosario rule.
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d. Computer Documents and Data Storage
Computer documents can be stored in dozens of different
types of storage media. One type is random access memory
("RAM"), which is erased when the power source is removed.8 7
A second type of media is magnetic storage, consisting of floppy
disks,88 internal hard disk drives (often known as the "C-drive"),
removable hard drives, and magnetic tapes.8 9 Optical storage
media are Compact Disc Read Only Memory ("CD-ROM"), CD-
Recordable ("CD-R" can be recorded only once), CD ReWriteable
("CD-RW" can be rewritten), and Digital Video Disc ("DVD").90
Regardless of the type of storage media involved or the type of
document stored, the information in a computer document is ul-
timately stored in binary form.91 The computer stores informa-
tion in bits, a unit of memory, regardless of the type of
underlying document. Word processing files, email files,
database files, voice mail files, graphics files, and software ap-
plications are all ultimately stored in binary form.
e. Types of Computer Data
There are four general types of computer data: active data,
inactive data, archival (backup) data, and residual data.92
These data categories are non-exclusive, and a digital file could
87. See Jeff Tyson, How Random Access Memory (RAM) Works, at http://www.
howstuffworks.comram.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002) (on file with the author).
'Virtual RAM" performs computer functions like normal RAM, but is actually
stored temporarily on the hard-drive. See Marshall Brain, How Virtual Memory
Works, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/virtual-memory.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2002).
88. Floppy disks are encased in a semi-rigid casing, but the storage medium
itself is very flexible. They are inserted into what is generally termed the "A-
drive."
89. See Gregory S. Johnson, A Practitioner's Overview of Digital Discovery, 33
GONZ. L. REV. 347, 351-52 (1997-1998).
90. See id.
91. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 84, at 333-34. Binary means a num-
ber system with only two digits. For computers, these digits are depicted as either
a "0", or "1" and are stored and transmitted in magnetic or electronic form. See id.
92. See Johnson, supra note 89, at 359-62 (categorizing data types as active,
inactive, archival, and residual); see also Joan E. Feldman & Rodger I. Kohn, The
Essentials of Computer Discovery (1999), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
THIRD ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 51-77 (1999) (categorizing information
processed and stored electronically as active data, replicant data, backup data, and
residual data).
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be categorized as each type of data within a short period.93 A
discussion of the various types of computer data is beyond the
scope of this comment, but it should be noted that data and doc-
uments are often created, saved, and preserved without the
knowledge of the user. For example, computer documents and
keystrokes are sometimes saved automatically by the computer
without the user's knowledge, and a document that the user be-
lieves has been erased may be recoverable. 94 This is an impor-
tant concept because statements may be "recorded" onto
computer hard drives without the user's knowledge, and also
because seemingly "lost or destroyed" documents may be
recoverable. 95
2. Computer Documents and the Duplicative Equivalent
Doctrine
Given the narrowness with which the New York Court of
Appeals has fashioned the duplicative equivalent exception, and
its holding that the exception does not apply if the material is
not presented to the court for inspection, 96 serious problems can
arise with respect to computer documents. Consider an investi-
gator or detective97 typing an investigation report in a word
processing program. The investigator may work on the report
over a period of hours, days, or months. The investigator will
surely make numerous changes to the document, and must fol-
low some sort of procedure to comply with the current duplica-
tive equivalent doctrine.
93. See Johnson, supra note 89, at 363.
94. See id.
95. In cases concerning raw data, database documents, or forensic analysis of
a computer to recover deleted files, electronic discovery will often be requested.
See Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 529-30 (1st Cir. 1996); United
States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.,
No. 94 CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995); Nat'l Union Elec.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (E.D. Pa. 1980); People
v. Giraldo, 705 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
96. See People v. Joseph, 658 N.E.2d 996, 998.
97. Police officers assigned to conduct investigative work involving serious
crimes are titled "detectives" or "investigators" depending upon the particular po-
lice agency. For consistency, I will refer to such officers as investigators. Investi-
gators generally create long investigation reports using word processors and are
often called to testify as prosecution witnesses. Thus, their reports are subject to
the Rosario rule.
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There are several procedures that police departments could
potentially implement in order to comply with the current du-
plicative equivalent doctrine, including manually preserving
versions, utilizing computerized (or automated) version preser-
vation such as through version control software, eliminating the
creation of different versions, or recording the changes made to
each version. However, for the reasons discussed below, none of
these methods will satisfy the current duplicative equivalent
doctrine.
Manual preservation of versions requires no special
software and thus is a feasible method, provided that the dupli-
cative equivalent doctrine is relaxed from its current rigid state.
In theory, an existing version should be preserved if future
changes and edits would result in a new version that is not a
duplicative equivalent of the existing version. The best way for
the investigator to preserve the existing version is to perform a
"save as" command periodically. Common sense might dictate
naming files in the following fashion: Doe Homicide 01-01-01
ver xx.98 Here, "xx" corresponds to the version number of the
report. Each time the investigator performs a "save as" com-
mand, he or she would increase the version number by one. The
final version would be printed and submitted for filing by the
investigator as the final report. If the case proceeds to a hear-
ing or trial, the investigator could then print any one or all of
the versions created so that they could be turned over to the
defense as Rosario material. Alternatively, the investigator
could periodically print copies of the report, rather than saving
the versions. This method has the disadvantage of creating a
lot of additional paper that would not be needed if the case
never proceeded to a hearing or trial.99
The primary problem with manual version preservation is
that it is unclear at which point the investigator must preserve
98. The filename would also include a filename extension, which would be ad-
ded by the software, such as ".WPD" or ".DOC."
99. Most criminal investigations do not result in an arrest, and most arrests
do not proceed to a hearing or trial. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 205 (2000), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/00crime3.pdf
(about 20% of crimes are cleared by arrest, the rest are unsolved); ANN L. PASTORE
AND KATHLEEN MAGUIRE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 457 (2 8 th
ed. 2000), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t542.pdf (over
90% of felony convictions are obtained through guilty plea rather than trial).
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a version, i.e., when do undocumented changes violate the du-
plicative equivalent doctrine? A strict application of the court of
appeals' current duplicative equivalent doctrine would seem to
require the investigator to preserve a version of the document
prior to each back-space, deletion, spell-check, or cut-and-paste
operation.100 Because mere omissions from one document pre-
clude a finding of duplicative equivalency, the investigator
could be required to preserve portions of the document periodi-
cally, even if the only changes are the addition of more text at
the end of the previous text. 10 Thus, the investigator might
create and save hundreds of versions by the time the report is
finalized. 0 2 This would be an overly burdensome result for all
parties, with reams of nearly identical documents changing
hands. Further, the versions preserved by the user are of little
additional value than the user's testimony in court regarding
any changes made to the document.
The second possible procedure is utilization of some form of
automated version preservation. One way this is technically
possible is by using the "undo/redo" information that word
processing software maintains. 0 3 Given our system of paper-
based discovery, the varieties of software used, and the ease
with which the undo/redo information can be manipulated, this
is not a viable method to preserve changes. Another method to
automatically preserve versions is to utilize the auto-saving,
auto-versioning feature of some computer software.10 4 How-
100. See People v. Dowling, 698 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("[Tlwo
items are duplicative equivalents only if they are identical in every detail .... ").
101. The question could turn on whether the additions were changes to a
"work-in-progress" or whether the additions were changes to an existing version.
See infra Part III.B.3.
102. See Christopher Yates, Eastman, FileNet, Lotus Wrestle Docs Well, at
http://www.zdnet.com/products/stories/reviews/0,4161,396386,00.html (March 28,
1999) ("Creating a new version every time a comma is changed could create a man-
agement and storage nightmare ... ."). The article also examines how electronic
document management software deals with versions, indicating the importance of
the user being able to have some control over what should be considered a new
version. See id.
103. Word processing software allows users to "undo" and "redo" operations
such as typing, editing, and formatting changes. Such software varies as to the
number of operations that are stored, i.e., the number of operations that can be
undone, and whether the information is saved with the document.
104. For example, Word 2000 allows the user to specify that the software cre-
ate a backup copy of a document each time a "save" operation is performed, and
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ever, these features are designed to protect the user's document
from being inadvertently damaged, and are not suitable for the
preservation of documents for the reasons expressed above.
Document version control software (also termed a docu-
ment management system) is currently being utilized by the
private sector to manage drafts and revisions. Such software is
capable of tracking all changes to a file, recording which user
made each change, and when each change was made.10 5 How-
ever, use of this software is not practical for police departments
because of the resources it requires to purchase and maintain
these systems. Costs of such software packages can be substan-
tial, and also they require an established computer network and
constant system administration and maintenance. In essence,
such software is advanced computer technology, and most police
departments are not capable of incorporating it now or in the
foreseeable future.10 6
has an "auto recover" feature which saves changes made at user-specified time
intervals. It also has a versioning feature that can be used to create a new version
every time the document is closed.
105. See LexTechInc., Document Management Systems - Overview, at http://
www.lextechinc.com/wired/documentmanagement/default.asp (last visited Feb. 14,
2002). According to LexTechInc.:
A good NDMS [Network Document Management System] should also make
it easy to 'manage' documents on the network. By manage, we mean the
ability to perform the following functions: . . . [aillow any user to track a
document's history (who was the last person to use this document?); [a]llow
users to track multiple versions of the same document and compare them.
Id.; see also PC Week Labs Staff, Shoot-Out Scorecard: Document Management
Packages, at http://www.zdnet.com/eweek/stories/general]0,11011,2230503,00.htm
(last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (defining versioning as "[tihe ability to automatically
and/or manually create and track the history of documents"); Qumasoft, Quma
Version Control System: Feature Summary, at http://www.qumasoft.confea
tures.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2000) (citing features such as: "Use a global journal
file to keep track of all changes to files in your project(s)"; "Keep track of who
changed what, and when they changed it"; "Compare files to earlier revisions or
compare revisions to other revisions"; and "Create a variety of reports [concerning
revisions]"); Worldox, The Case for Electronic Document Management, at http://
www.worldox.com/atwork/whydms.html (last visited Mar 23, 2002) (listing capa-
bility of Worldox 96 software to track "document history" which is also known as
"audit trails").
106. As an example of the current state of police technology, one of New York
State's largest police agencies still utilizes the "blotter" system, which has been in
existence since the early 1900s. Under such a system, patrol activity and arrests
are handwritten into a bound ledger. It is unrealistic to expect that such a police
agency is capable of implementing an effective document management system.
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Elimination of the user's ability to create different versions,
another potential procedure, is similarly impractical. Specially
designed software for a police agency could prohibit investiga-
tors from changing a document,10 7 and anything typed would
become a permanent record that could not be modified. On its
face, this software would eliminate the potential problems re-
garding computer Rosario material; however, it is also clear
that use of such software would eliminate the benefits of com-
puters and word processors.
Another potential procedure would require the investigator
to maintain a separate log of all the changes made to the report.
Such a log might list each and every edit, correction, and
change made. Such a log may, however, take as long to com-
plete as the document itself. Further, if this log were kept in a
computer document, it might be necessary to maintain a second
log in order to preserve any changes made to the first log. This
is unrealistic and unduly burdensome. 08
An even more impractical solution would be to require the
creation of the report to be videotaped. Although this procedure
is consistent with the court of appeals' theory that a police of-
ficer is not competent to testify regarding any changes made to
a document, it is clearly unworkable.
A legal standard for computer Rosario material should not
require the use of specific software because such a standard
would require that all police agencies in New York State con-
form, purchase, install, and maintain the designated software.
There are approximately 440 police agencies in New York;10 9
the multitude and diversity of these agencies create numerous
roadblocks to the creation of a uniform software standard. For
example, many of these agencies have less than thirty sworn
personnel, and many have multiple precincts or stations. Addi-
tionally, police agencies lack the resources that would enable
them to purchase and maintain the most current software and
hardware, which is rapidly changing. In sum, a legal standard
107. This system would have to be specifically made for police agencies be-
cause no other types of consumers would want such a system.
108. Nearly all procedures designed to protect the rights of defendants are
burdensome to police. Here, however, the additional protection of a defendant's
rights is negligible, and the burden on police is enormous.
109. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 299
(2000), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_99/99crime/99cius6.pdf.
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that either implicitly or explicitly incorporates specific software
requirements will most likely fail.
One aspect of computer documents that should be
remembered is that, unlike paper documents (which once lost or
destroyed, are generally lost or destroyed forever), electronic in-
formation may exist on a computer system in various forms in-
definitely. Close examination of a computer system through on-
site inspection, copying data bit for bit, and subsequent analysis
might reveal additional information, and might restore purged
or lost documents. Thus, the defense counsel could request
some type of computer forensic analysis in order to obtain this
electronic information.
3. New Technology Brings New Forms of Recorded
Statements
The term "recorded statement" now comprises technologi-
cal forms of statements, such as statements recorded by in-car
computers, handheld computers, police in-car cameras and/or
audio recording,110 email, 1 and voice mail," 2 that were not
foreseen by the creators of the Rosario rule.
Personal Digital Assistants ("PDAs") 1 3 are already used by
a few investigators, and could become more prevalent in the fu-
110. Installation and utilization of police in-car cameras are becoming more
prevalent. Often these cameras are capable of recording audio as well. Any audio
recording of the police officer's statements during an investigation or arrest situa-
tion could be Rosario material with respect to that officer's testimony. There is an
administrative burden placed upon police agencies to store and provide these vide-
otapes, which is magnified if the tapes are deemed discoverable.
111. Email presents the same concerns regarding editing as computer word
processing documents.
112. Voice mail messages are stored on a central computer in digital form,
rather than the traditional analog audiotape of an answering machine. In theory,
it should be relatively simple to archive voice mail messages, such as by saving
them onto a floppy disk or into a separate computer directory. Prior to a hearing
or trial, the message could be recorded onto a standard audiotape for convenience.
In practice, however, the user usually can only access the message through the
phone, and has little ability to archive messages for retrieval months later.
113. These devices are also described as Personal Information Managers
(PIMs), handheld computers, or palm-sized computers. A popular brand is made
by Palm Computing Inc. Palm Computing, Inc.'s original computer was the Palm
Pilot and now has a series of Palm computers. See Craig C. Freudenrich, Ph.D.,
How Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) Work, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/
pda.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
432
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/6
THE NEW YORK ROSARIO RULE
ture. 114 PDAs are handheld computers that can perform many
of the tasks of traditional computers, including creating and ed-
iting text, word processing, e-mailing, tracking appointments,
and other database operations. PDAs have no hard drive or
floppy drive; data is stored in RAM, which is kept powered
through a battery that must be periodically recharged or re-
placed. Data can be exchanged between PDAs and computers
through a direct connection or various types of wireless data
transfers. Use of PDAs would allow police officers to revise
their electronic notes without detection. However, this is not a
new or unique problem, as officers have always been theoreti-
cally able to simply copy their notes and destroy the original. 115
PDAs and PDA text documents should be treated exactly
like laptop or desktop computers and computer documents for
purposes of Rosario analysis. The same issues presented by
traditional computers regarding the editing of electronic docu-
ments are presented by PDAs. Any distinctions between PDAs
and more traditional computers are irrelevant to Rosario
analysis. 116
C. New York Case Law Regarding Computer-Related Witness
Statements
1. The Current New York Duplicative Equivalent
Doctrine is a Significant Barrier to a Rational
Consideration of Computer Documents Under
Rosario
Under People v. Joseph, normal (undocumented) computer
editing creates a Rosario violation and a finding of trial error
because the trial court was not able to inspect the document to
determine whether the statement it contained was duplicated
elsewhere.11 7 Thus, the mere fact that a document was edited
leads to the conclusion that the prior version could not be iden-
114. See Michael West, Personal Digital Assistants for Investigators, at http://
webm9291.iml.net/fallOO/pda.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
115. Few departments require their investigators or officers to write notes in
official, sequentially numbered notebooks. Such a procedure might make some in-
stances of Rosario destruction more evident, but imposes an administrative
burden.
116. An alleged distinction based upon storage of documents in RAM is ad-
dressed infra Part III.A.1.
117. See People v. Joseph, 658 N.E.2d 996, 998 (N.Y. 1995).
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tical to the discovered material. In Joseph, the court of appeals
further held that a police officer's testimony (sworn, in court,
and subject to cross-examination) that the destroyed material
was identical to the discovered material is insufficient to pre-
vent a finding of a Rosario violation.11 In other words, the
court fashioned a rule that a police officer's testimony regarding
destroyed Rosario material is per se unreliable.119 This holding
conflicts somewhat with People v. Poole, in which the court held
that a prosecutor's proffer (an unsworn statement as an officer
of the court) that no other Rosario material exists can foreclose
further investigation as to whether additional material does in
fact exist. 120 Naturally, the prosecutor's basis for knowledge in
making this proffer consists of the unsworn, out-of-court state-
ments made by police officers to the prosecutor. 121 These hold-
ings create an irrational distinction: a prosecutor's in-court
proffer regarding the unsworn, out-of-court statements of a po-
lice officer is deemed more reliable than the sworn, in-court tes-
timony of a police officer. 22
The following hypothetical situations consider all combina-
tions concerning disclosure of a witness' prior recorded state-
ments. First, we consider two statements that are not
duplicative equivalents, and consider what happens when one
of the statements is (a) disclosed, (b) not disclosed and lost or
destroyed permanently, or (c) not disclosed but preserved for
118. See id. at 1000.
119. Just as the Ranghelle rule removed the ability of the appellate court to
determine if certain Rosario violations were harmless, this rule removes the ability
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the officer and determine if duplicative
equivalents of the statements existed. See infra Part III.B.
120. People v. Poole, 397 N.E.2d at 700 (N.Y. 1979).
121. In other words, the prosecutor will ask the police officers (orally or some-
times by letter) for all Rosario material. The officers will give the prosecutor docu-
ments and state that no other documents exist. With this as a basis for knowledge,
the prosecutor will tell the defense and the court that all Rosario material has
been turned over.
122. It can be argued that this distinction is rational, based upon a shifting of
presumptions. The Poole criteria rely upon a presumption that the People have
complied with Rosario requirements, and require that the defense produce evi-
dence that the People have not complied. See Poole, 397 N.E.2d at 700. The Jo-
seph criteria create an apparent presumption that by destroying any material, the
police have violated Rosario and, since Rosario deals with credibility, the police
should not be allowed to absolve themselves of their violation through unimpeach-
able testimony. Joseph, 658 N.E.2d at 998.
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appellate review. When the statements are not duplicative
equivalents, the results make sense. However, when we ex-
amine what is supposed to occur with two documents that are
duplicative equivalents, it becomes apparent that the current
duplicative equivalent doctrine makes very little sense.
i. Hypothetical Situation One (Documents are not Duplica-
tive Equivalents)
Assumptions:
" Two documents are created which are not duplicative
equivalents of one another.
" Document A contains recorded statements (not contained
in Document B) that could be used to impeach the credi-
bility of the officer (prosecution witness).
Situation (a):
" Documents A and B are both disclosed.
" This is in keeping with the true spirit of Rosario. The
defense has access to the statements in Document A, and
can use the statements to cross-examine the witness.
Situation (b):
" Document B is disclosed, but Document A is lost or
destroyed.
" If the officer testifies that Document B was identical to
Document A, the court cannot consider his testimony
(which is a proper result, because, given our assump-
tions, the testimony would be false). The prosecution
will be sanctioned 123 for the failure to produce Document
A (which is the proper result, because the defense was
denied impeachment material and was prejudiced).
Situation (c):
" Document B is disclosed, but Document A is not, al-
though it is preserved for appellate review.
" When the Rosario issue is raised for appellate review,
the court will examine and compare Documents A and B,
find that they are not duplicative equivalents, and order
123. The prosecutor will be sanctioned in the form of an adverse inference
instruction regarding the witness' credibility, or preclusion of the witness' testi-
mony. See People v. Banch, 608 N.E.2d1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Martinez,
524 N.E.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. 1988).
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the appropriate remedy (reversal of conviction if defense
was prejudiced).124
ii. Hypothetical Situation Two (Documents are Duplicative
Equivalents)
Assumptions:
* Two documents are created which are duplicative
equivalents of one another, i.e., assume the two docu-
ments are essentially identical.
Situation (a):
" Documents A and B are both disclosed.
" Disclosure is the procedure recommended by the court of
appeals for any potential Rosario material.
" The problem here is that disclosure of identical docu-
ments serves no purpose. 125
Situation (b):
" Document B is disclosed, but Document A is lost or
destroyed.
" If the officer testifies that Document B was identical to
Document A, the court is not allowed to consider this
testimony.
" The prosecution will be sanctioned for the failure to pro-
duce Document A.
Situation (c):
" Document B is disclosed, but Document A is not, al-
though it is preserved for appellate review.
" When the Rosario issue is raised for appellate review,
the court will examine and compare Documents A and B,
find that they are identical, and affirm the conviction. x26
These hypothetical situations make apparent a catch-22 re-
garding the court of appeals' duplicative equivalent doctrine.
On the one hand, identical (duplicative) documents do not have
to be disclosed to the defense. On the other hand, if an officer
lost or destroyed an identical document, the document cannot
124. Prior to the enactment of section 240.75 of the C.P.L, reversal was
mandatory. See People v. Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (N.Y. 1986).
125. The next logical question is whether disclosure of one identical document
is any better or worse than disclosure of fifty identical documents.
126. Preserving identical documents serves no purpose. How many identical
copies should the court examine?
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be considered to be an identical document by the court because
it cannot be inspected. Because this lost identical document
cannot be considered a duplicative equivalent document, the
court is forced to rule that the defense was prejudiced by its loss
or destruction. It is hard to see how any alleged prejudice to the
defendant is avoided by saving and disclosing identical
documents.
The factual problems surrounding the duplicative
equivalent doctrine may not come to light with great frequency,
but they are unavoidable with respect to computer documents.
There must be some "commonsense limits" upon Rosario mater-
ials and the rigid duplicative equivalent doctrine, 127 and thus
the duplicative equivalent doctrine should be broadened.
2. New York Case Law Directly Addressing Computer-
Related Witness Statements
There are few reported cases in New York State that con-
cern both computer documents and Rosario issues. In People v.
Giraldo,12s the defense counsel requested at trial that the prose-
cution produce a computer diskette upon which the prosecution
witness had saved a report. 129 The First Department held:
The [trial] court properly declined to direct the People to produce
a computer diskette upon which a People's witness had saved a
report, because defendant had been provided with the identical
information (and not merely a duplicative equivalent) in printed,
and therefore readable, form. The court correctly held that by
providing a hard copy printed from the corresponding file, the
People had satisfied their obligation pursuant to People v.
Rosario.1
30
On appeal, the defense contended that disclosure of the dis-
kette was required "so that he could attempt to retrieve any hy-
pothetical prior versions of the report or deleted material,
127. See Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d at 1015 ("Notwithstanding the strong pre-
sumption of the discoverability of prior statements of prosecution witnesses under
the Rosario rule, we have fashioned some commonsense limits to mandatory
disclosure.").
128. 705 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
129. Id. at 336. The analysis is not affected by the fact that the report was
created by a federal special agent rather than a state or local law enforcement
officer.
130. Id. (citation omitted).
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possibly through the use of file-recovery software." 131 The First
Department stated that this claim was unpreserved and de-
clined to review it "in the interest of justice" noting, "[w]ere we
to review this claim, we would reject it. We need not decide
under what circumstances, if any, disclosure of computer stor-
age media might be required notwithstanding disclosure of
printed documents." 132 The First Department also stated, "On
the present record, including the witness' testimony on the sub-
ject, we find no basis, other than speculation, to suspect that
analysis of the diskette might have revealed prior versions or
deleted material."133
Giraldo implies two points. First, for purposes of Rosario
with respect to a word processing document, printed material is
considered to be identical to the computer document, and not
just a duplicative equivalent. 34 Second, the court refused to
rule out the possibility that disclosure of law enforcement's
computer storage media could be ordered, hinting that if there
were some evidence that other versions or drafts did exist on
the diskette, disclosure of the diskette could be ordered. 35
The Giraldo court avoided addressing whether edits affect
the Rosario requirements. From the opinion, it cannot be deter-
mined if the witness testified that (1) no prior versions of the
document were ever in existence, and no deletions were ever
made, or (2) there were no prior versions or deleted material on
131. Id. Note that a floppy diskette would have limited use for forensic analy-
sis compared with an entire hard drive. A floppy diskette could have residual data
or documents of any type, depending on its use, and a new (blank) floppy diskette
with the document copied onto it would have no residual data. Because floppy
diskettes are of minimal use and can be handed over with minimal intrusion,
query whether the holding would have been worded differently had the defense
requested to inspect the police department's hard drives or network drives. Most
computer material is stored on hard drives, which cannot be inspected without
considerable intrusion.
132. Id. (citing Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996)
and United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976)). Fennell and Davey are
discussed in infra Part II.D.
133. Giraldo, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
134. See id. The C.P.L. has no definition of what constitutes a writing or re-
cording, but the implied holding in Giraldo is consistent with the definition of
"original" found in Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(3). See FED. R. EVID. 1001(3).
135. See id. In Part III.C., I argue that consideration of such disclosure is
worrisome and unwarranted.
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that specific computer diskette. 136 It is not clear whether this
distinction would have made a difference, nor is it clear how the
court would have defined a "version." With respect to electronic
discovery, the holding is arguably dicta because the court ex-
pressly declined to decide the issue. Thus, Giraldo is of limited
precedential value, even within the First Department.
Several other New York Appellate Division cases have
dealt with computer documents, but they do not squarely ad-
dress the subject of this comment. Specifically, the cases failed
to address how changes to a computer document affect the pros-
ecution's Rosario requirements. For example, in People v.
Spinks,137 the police officer transcribed handwritten notes ver-
batim into a computer document, and then destroyed the hand-
written notes. 138 The Third Department affirmed the trial
court's failure to impose any sanction for the destruction of the
handwritten notes. 139 Although the facts involved a computer,
this did not affect the holding, and the holding should not be
valid after Joseph. 140 Instead, the issue addressed by the court
involved the destruction of the handwritten notes, which is
clearly impermissible. In People v. Moolenaar,'4' the First De-
partment addressed a "computer generated police form" and
held that the particular form did not constitute Rosario mate-
rial. 142 In People v. Grant,143 an officer "generated" a narcotics-
related form, and then destroyed the form after the information
had been transferred into the computer system. 44 Again, the
issue addressed by the court was the destruction of the hand-
136. Although not mentioned or decided in the opinion, the People's appellate
brief states that there was no testimony or any other evidence that the special
agent altered or revised the document at all. See Brief for Appellee at Point IV.B.,
People v. Giraldo, 705 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (on file with author).
137. 613 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
138. Id. at 289.
139. Id.
140. See People v. Joseph, 658 N.E.2d 996, 998 (N.Y. 1995) (duplicative
equivalent exception is not available if documents are lost or destroyed).
141. 616 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
142. Id. at 590. "[I]t contained no actual pretrial statements of witnesses but
only a digest of certain portions of preexisting recorded witness statements that
had been turned over to the defense at trial." Id. at 590-91. (citation omitted). It
appears that the fact that a computer was used was irrelevant to the court's
decision.
143. 688 N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Div. 1999).
144. Id. at 131-32.
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written notes, rather than any unique effect resulting from use
of a computer, and the First Department upheld the trial court's
refusal to sanction the prosecution.145
The trial court decision, People v. Cortez,146 appears to be
unique as a reported criminal case that addresses some of the
technical issues created by new technology. Cortez concerned
the New York City Police Department's ("NYPD") failure to
turn over audiotapes of radio transmissions. The court held
that the People and NYPD had an obligation to produce the
tapes because they were Rosario material.147 The court stated:
The master tapes kept by the Police Department Communications
Division are simply a storage medium. The tapes themselves are
not Rosario material. Audio tape should be treated no differently,
for Rosario analysis, from any other storage medium, e.g., paper,
videotape, or computer disc. If a storage medium contains Rosa-
rio material, the Rosario material must be accurately copied,
without editing, in the same medium. 148
The court should not have distinguished between forms of
storage media. Assuming that electronic discovery was ordered,
the fact that data were stored on a hard drive, or magnetic tape
drive, should surely not preclude turning over the documents in
a different medium such as a floppy disk. In addition, computer
documents are ultimately stored as binary digits, but it would
make no sense at all to require discovery of documents in binary
language consisting only of "0"s and "1"s.
145. See id. at 132. However, the Joseph and Banch decisions indicated that
the trial court must impose some sanction for the destruction of Rosario material.
See Joseph, 658 N.E.2d at 999; Banch, 608 N.E.2d at 1072. Thus, the ruling in
Grant was incorrect. Though the appellate division in Grant conceded that some
Rosario material may have been destroyed, it applied a prejudice standard, and
found that no sanction was needed. The court indicated that actions by the de-
fense attorney, such as rigorous cross-examination regarding the destruction of
Rosario material, and referring to the destruction in summation, eliminated any
prejudice to the defendant. See Grant, 688 N.Y.S.2d 130 at 132.
146. 564 N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1990).
147. See id. at 967-68. The NYPD was doubly obligated to produce these
materials because they had been subpoenaed. See id. at 966.
148. Id.
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D. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions Regarding Computer-
Related Witness Statements
As illustrated by the Ranghelle rule and the duplicative
equivalent doctrine, New York courts have been consistently
harder on police and prosecutors than any other jurisdiction.149
In jurisdictions more lenient towards the prosecution, com-
puters do not create a discovery issue with respect to prior
statements of witnesses. As a result, case law from other states
regarding computerized witness statements is sparse and fails
to address the topic of this comment. 150
Although federal case law regarding computer-related wit-
ness statements primarily deals with civil discovery, or data
documents, a brief examination of the case law is nevertheless
helpful. 151 For example, in Fennell v. First Step Designs Ltd.,152
the First Circuit addressed a civil discovery dispute in which
the plaintiff alleged that a particular memo written by the
plaintiff had been fraudulently backdated and requested an or-
der allowing personal inspection of the defendant's hard drives
in order to determine when exactly the memo was written. 153
The First Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant the
additional discovery, citing the district court's "broad discre-
tion" to decide such a request and a discovery standard that bal-
anced "substantial risks and costs" of such discovery with the
149. See People v. Jones, 517 N.E.2d 865, 870 (N.Y. 1987) (Bellacosa, J., con-
curring) ("[N]o other jurisdiction has a Ranghelle-type rule."); cf. Robert M. Pitler,
Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New State Court of
Appeals' Quest for Principled Decision Making, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 17 (1996). "In
all, twenty decisions over the past sixteen years have resulted in greater New York
State search and seizure protection than that provided by the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. "All too many of these decisions are unsupported by any of the tradi-
tional bases of constitutional interpretation ... Absent from these state decisions
were carefully crafted, reasoned, logical, principle-guided, policy-based and prece-
dent-supported opinions-hallmarks of the judicial process." Id. at 17-18.
150. In Mangione v. State, 740 So. 2d 444 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), the police
witness took notes by hand and on a laptop computer. The defense objected to the
admission of a police witness' computer notes into evidence. The court of criminal
appeals held there was no error in admitting the computer notes into evidence
because the defense had opened the door by asking about them. Id. at 454-55.
151. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 94CIV.2120, 1995 WL
649934, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) ("[T]oday it is black letter law that comput-
erized data is discoverable if relevant."). This pronouncement cannot be applied to
criminal discovery. See infra Part III.C.
152. 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996).
153. See id. at 529-30.
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evidence of "a particularized likelihood of discovering appropri-
ate information."1 54 The Fennell court also held that the trial
court should consider whether there is evidence of
fabrication. 155
Although Fennell is mentioned in People v. Giraldo, its ap-
plication to criminal cases should be limited to its emphasis on
the risks and costs upon a party when discovery is sought of its
computer system. Risks and costs considered should include
the irreparable harm caused by the exposure of confidential in-
formation, as well as the potential for damage to the computer
system.
In another federal case, United States v. Davey, the Second
Circuit held that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") was enti-
tled to discovery of the original (magnetic) computer tapes cre-
ated by a taxpayer defendant and did not have to accept
purported duplicates or paper printouts (hardcopy).156 The
IRS's motivation for seeking the computer tapes was both for
convenience 157 and to help ensure there was no fraud in-
volved. 58 Davey's "form of production" analysis is relevant to
the focus of this comment as far as it dealt with concerns re-
garding the falsification of computer material, because falsifica-
tion is an issue of witness credibility that the Rosario rule was
meant to address. Davey is distinguishable from the focus of
this comment because it concerns database electronic docu-
ments and a law enforcement subpoena served upon a defen-
dant rather than discovery requested by a defendant.
In United States v. Dioguardi,59 the Second Circuit held
that the government was required to produce the actual com-
puter program that it used to analyze the defendant's inven-
154. See id. at 532-33.
155. See id. at 533-34.
156. United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 998 (2d Cir. 1976).
157. See id. at 1000. (Production of magnetic tapes would "insure greater ac-
curacy and a substantial saving in auditing time" and the taxpayer should not be
allowed to produce requested information in an "inconvenient form.").
158. Id. (The IRS "should not be required to rely on the taxpayer's affidavit
that a print-out accurately reproduces all information on requested tapes. Such a
holding would run contrary to the investigatorial purpose of the audit.").
159. 428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1970).
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tory, rather than simply producing computer printouts. 160
Dioguardi dealt with database analysis and input-output com-
puter programs, and thus is distinguishable from circumstances
dealing with computer text documents.
III. Proposed Standards for Courts Regarding Computer-
Related Rosario Issues
A. Initial Findings
Courts must confront the Rosario issues created by com-
puter technology, and create commonsense standards that are
realistic and fair to both the prosecution and the defense. Al-
though courts now have the discretion to find Rosario violations
harmless, it would be unfair for them to find a Rosario violation
at every keystroke, only to find that the error was harmless. 16'
Such an application creates a Rosario standard that police can-
not meet, and the police would be committing "error" and pre-
sumably violating the rights of a defendant, even when taking
the utmost practical care to do otherwise. It is also unfair to
saddle the prosecution with adverse inference instructions as a
matter of course in order to compensate for the routine com-
puter editing done by prosecution witnesses.
Perhaps rigid Rosario rules exist as an attempt to ensure
that police will not falsify reports or testimony, or to ensure that
they will be caught if they do. The assumption inherent in this
rationale is that some police officers will tell a modified version
of the facts. This assumption conflicts with the purpose of the
Rosario rules, because an officer who is inclined to testify
falsely regarding the primary subject matter of his testimony is
also unlikely to testify truthfully regarding the existence or con-
160. See id. at 1038 (citing United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969)).
But see United States v. Alexander, 789 F.2d 1046, 1049 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the Jencks Act does not apply to peer programs and printouts).
161. Such an unfair and unrealistic standard could arguably give some of-
ficers the impression that judges expect a certain amount of lying, since a com-
pletely truthful account could never pass judicial muster. For example, one
appellate court indicated in dicta: "One might come to the conclusion that the Ro-
sario doctrine, as it has been extended, acts more to create traps for honest, but
unwary police officers and prosecutors, than to serve as remedial protection for
defendants." People v. Hardy, 577 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). The
court went on to discount this view of the Rosario doctrine on the grounds that the
problem may be remedied simply with an adverse inference instruction. Id. at 812.
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tents of potential Rosario material. 162 In most cases, the officer
is the only one with knowledge as to whether non-disclosed re-
corded statements exist, and therefore such testimony is often
incapable of being impeached.
1. "Recording" Occurs upon Keystroke
A writing should be deemed recorded as soon as keystrokes
are typed and appear on the computer monitor. Upon keys-
troke, magnetic/electronic impulses and currents flow between
the keyboard, computer, and computer monitor. The informa-
tion is instantly stored in RAM, which is nearly as permanent a
medium as any other type of storage media. Such a definition of
recording is supported by Federal Rule of Evidence 1001, which
provides that a writing and recording consists of letters, words
or numbers set down by "magnetic impulse, mechanical or elec-
tronic recording, or other form of data compilation." 163
There is no sound reason to impose any other standard to
determine when or if a statement has been recorded. Any stan-
dard that places emphasis upon the acts of printing (onto paper)
or saving (onto a hard drive or floppy disk) will fail; a proper
standard must recognize that storage in RAM constitutes re-
cording. RAM is as permanent as the power source, whether it
is AC current or battery. Power sources today are extremely
reliable, virtually indefinite. PDAs store data exclusively and
indefinitely in RAM, and material recorded in PDAs should not
be exempted from Rosario requirements. Failing to recognize
RAM-stored material as a recording would allow infinite
changes to a document to be made as long as the document is
not saved onto a hard drive or printed. This result is not consis-
tent with the policies behind the Rosario rule. Finally, a dis-
tinction based upon when the document is saved or printed
conflicts with the fact that a computer may automatically, and
unknowingly to the user, save documents or parts of documents
on the hard drive. 164 Thus, such a distinction creates an impos-
162. It is interesting that the witness' testimony can be considered regarding
the existence of other Rosario material, but such testimony cannot be considered
regarding the contents of such material.
163. FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).
164. This may take place through placing data in virtual RAM, by saving data
in temporary files, or by making backups.
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sible factual issue as to whether the material was ever saved
onto a hard drive.
It is reasonable and necessary to conclude that recording
occurs at keystroke; a conclusion that will survive through the
rapid change of computer technology. From this viewpoint, we
can begin to develop a meaningful Rosario doctrine.
2. Computer Documents are Almost Always Edited
It is necessary to recognize that editing almost always oc-
curs in computer documents. It is unrealistic for a court to ex-
pect that documents can be created without any corrections.
Thus, a court should not assume bad faith on the part of the
prosecution witness, or that a violation of the defendant's rights
has occurred, when such edits and corrections have been made.
Courts should expect that a diligent investigator would double-
check his or her report for errors and inaccuracies, and make
any necessary corrections. This is not to suggest that police
should have free reign to make undocumented changes, but
they must be given some limited discretion.
3. Police Should Only Be Required To Manually Preserve
Document Versions
Provided that the duplicative equivalent doctrine is modi-
fied as proposed in this comment, 165 manual version preserva-
tion is the sole practical means whereby recorded statements
could be preserved. It is possible to create a workable standard
that requires the user to manually save versions at periodic in-
tervals. Such a standard could be flexible enough to work with
existing and future technology and software, and it does not re-
quire that the judiciary (or legislature) make decisions and
guidelines relating to technical software issues or software ac-
quisition. How a "new" or "different" version is defined is im-
portant because the distinction affects what versions must be
preserved, and the definition should be consistent with a re-
vised duplicative equivalent doctrine.
A significant disadvantage of such a standard is that it ex-
pressly grants police the right to decide which changes and ed-
its are important. Such a grant of power seems contrary to the
165. See infra Part II.B.
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policy of Rosario, but considering the amount of discretion and
the vast responsibilities that police possess, this is a minor and
unavoidable grant of discretion. 166
Standards that require automatic version creation, version
control software, and document version elimination all require
complex decisions regarding software, hardware, cost-benefit
analysis, and system maintenance. 167 It is doubtful that the ju-
diciary would have the authority or expertise to make such
software decisions. The legislature might be better suited to
create a state-wide police computer reporting system, but this is
both unlikely and impractical given that potential Rosario vio-
lations are a relatively low priority in comparison to the many
issues facing police agencies and the administration of justice.
B. The Duplicative Equivalent Doctrine Must be Modified
1. The Court of Appeals Must Modify the Duplicative
Equivalent Doctrine For Computer Recorded
Statements
The New York Court of Appeals has an opportunity to re-
verse its duplicative equivalent doctrine because section 240.75
requires that the Rosario rule be revisited. If the court does not
make such a modification, it will be necessary for the legisla-
ture to modify the doctrine by statute.
As discussed above, the current duplicative equivalent doc-
trine is too narrow for computer documents, and must be broad-
ened. 168 If the duplicative equivalent doctrine is not broadened
for computer documents, there will nearly always be a Rosario
violation whenever computer documents are involved. Further-
more, development of sound police practice is thwarted if the
courts fail to address what constitutes Rosario material. 69
In reconsidering the Rosario rule in light of section 240.75
of the C.P.L., the court of appeals should not require that all
minor changes and edits be preserved for disclosure. It should
hold that computer documents are duplicative equivalents of
166. Note that the investigator will still be subject to cross-examination re-
garding any changes made to the document. See infra Part III.B.3.
167. See supra Part II.B.
168. See supra Part II.C.1.
169. Courts may do this by assuming that there was a violation, but finding
no prejudice to the defense. See supra Part II.A.3.
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each other if they are similar in all respects except for minor
changes and edits. 170 Such a broadening of the duplicative
equivalent doctrine will undoubtedly solve many of the Rosario
issues with respect to computer documents.
2. It Would Be Illogical to Have Separate Standards for
Computer Documents and Traditional Documents
There is no logical reason to distinguish computer docu-
ments from traditional documents with respect to the disclosure
requirements under Rosario. Computer documents merely
make an existing problem impossible to ignore. Differing dupli-
cative equivalent standards would create additional complica-
tions and confusion, and would create a collateral issue of
whether a particular document is a computer document or a
traditional document. Such a determination may not always be
simple, 17' and even if it was simple, an illogical distinction is
harmful to the law and administration of justice.
3. Proposed Modification of the Duplicative Equivalent
Doctrine For All Rosario Material
a. Create a Work-in-Progress Exemption
Creation of a "work-in-progress" exemption for all Rosario
material is a practical idea. Such an exemption would recognize
that typographical and other types of errors occur, and that pre-
serving such errors is not necessary under the spirit of Rosario.
Such an exemption gives an investigator adequate time to pre-
pare, revise, and proofread the report. When the report is con-
sidered final by the investigator, or when it is submitted for
review, this "work-in-progress" exemption would no longer be
applicable.
170. See infra Part III.D.2. for a proposed definition for the term "duplicative
equivalent."
171. For example, some word processing typewriters can be set to type imme-
diately upon keystroke, can display a small quantity of text on a screen before
typing it, or can allow text to be entered onto the screen, edited, and saved without
any printout. Some documents could be partially completed on a computer and
partially completed by hand.
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b. Allow Consideration of the Witness' Testimony
with Respect to Lost or Destroyed Recorded
Statements
When the court of appeals created the Ranghelle rule,172 it
imposed a rigid per se reversal rule upon appellate justices that
suggested that they were unable or unqualified to determine
whether the defendant had been denied a fair trial because of a
Rosario violation. The court of appeals in Joseph similarly im-
posed a rigid rule upon trial court judges,173 implying that they
were unable or unqualified to assess credibility when duplica-
tive equivalency is at issue. The Ranghelle rule has been legis-
latively overturned; the rule espoused in Joseph must be
overturned as well. Prosecution witnesses should be allowed to
testify regarding material that has been lost or destroyed.174
The trial court judge is qualified to determine whether the wit-
ness is credible, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by
any loss or destruction of material. 175 If necessary, the trial
judge is always free to sanction the prosecution through an ad-
verse inference instruction or preclusion of the witness' testi-
mony, but the trial judge should be allowed to determine
whether a Rosario violation has occurred.
c. Continue to Allow Cross-Examination Regarding
Changes Made to Documents
Defense attorneys should be able to cross-examine wit-
nesses regarding document edits. Similarly, the prosecution
witness should be allowed to explain any loss or destruction of
recorded statements. Finally, the trier-of-fact must perform its
legal duty and assess the witness' credibility, taking into con-
sideration the testimony, cross-examination, arguments, and
jury instructions.
172. See People v. Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1015-17 (N.Y. 1986).
173. See People v. Joseph, 658 N.E.2d 996, 998 (N.Y. 1995).
174. Of course, such testimony would be subject to cross-examination as de-
scribed infra Part III.B.3.
175. The court of appeals should neither perform this credibility assessment,
nor remove the trial judge's ability to assess credibility. By precluding testimony
on the issue of lost Rosario material, the court of appeals essentially holds that
such testimony is per se unreliable.
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d. Continue to Allow Adverse Inference Instructions,
but only upon a Finding of a Rosario
Violation
No adverse inference instruction should be given unless the
prosecution has violated a Rosario duty.176 If the prosecution
does violate such a duty and the defense is prejudiced, the trial
court should impose an appropriate sanction, which usually will
take the form of an adverse inference instruction. There is no
pattern jury instruction for an adverse inference charge, and
the language is within the discretion of the trial court. The fol-
lowing is a proposed adverse inference instruction:
The People have the burden of preserving recorded statements of
a prosecution witness (Rosario material). You've heard testimony
from a police officer in this case that the statement[s] had been
lost [destroyed], and thus there was a failure on the part of the
People to preserve those statement[s].
You may consider the failure of the People to preserve the state-
ment[s] in determining the weight to be given to the testimony.
The failure of the People to preserve the statement[s], permits,
but does not require, for you to infer that had the statement[s]
been preserved, its contents would not support, or might even con-
tradict, the testimony of the People's witness on that issue.
You may also consider the explanation offered by the People for
the failure to preserve the statement[s]. And if the explanation
satisfies you, then you may disregard the People's failure to pre-
serve the statement[s]. 177
176. As stated above, a broadened duplicative equivalent exception must be
adopted for all recorded statements. If the duplicative equivalent exception is not
broadened, then computer documents will almost always contain a Rosario viola-
tion. See supra Part III.B.1.
177. The proposed instruction was adapted from an adverse inference instruc-
tion that was given regarding destroyed physical evidence (drugs). See People v.
Gibbs, 615 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (Murphy, J., dissenting), affd,
650 N.E. 2d 1316 (N.Y. 1995). In Gibbs, the majority of the appellate division ap-
proved the trial court's adverse inference instruction, but it was the dissent that
actually quoted the trial court's instruction. The court of appeals approved of the
Gibbs instruction with respect to physical evidence. People v. Gibbs, 650 N.E.2d
1316 (N.Y. 1995). The general language of the Gibbs instruction was approved for
Rosario violations by the First Department in People v. McLean, 619 N.Y.S.2d 554,
555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). In People v. Matarrese, the Second Department ap-
proved but only generally described the trial court's adverse inference instruction.
584 N.Y.S.2d 618, 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) ("The court instructed the jurors that
they could infer that the witness' original statement, which was lost by the police
... would contradict both her trial testimony, and a later statement obtained from
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C. Defendants Should Not be Allowed to Conduct Any
Discovery of Police or Prosecution Storage Devices
Discovery of law enforcement's computer system by a de-
fendant should never be allowed. The factors weighing against
allowing such discovery of a civil party's computer system also
apply to discovery of law enforcement's computer system.178 In
addition, the same factors that preclude the defense from per-
forming a search of official law enforcement files, notebooks,
and lockers of police officers would preclude the defense from
inspecting law enforcement's computer systems. Many of law
enforcement's files are kept confidential in order to protect
ongoing investigations, as well as the privacy and safety of third
parties and police officers. Although there are many ways to
obtain information from law enforcement's files (such as crimi-
nal discovery, civil discovery, subpoena, and the Freedom of In-
formation Law), these methods have never included on-site,
personal inspection.
In People v. Poole, the court of appeals held that the prose-
cutor's proffer could be sufficient for the court to find that all
Rosario material had been disclosed. 179 However, even if the
defense articulates a factual basis sufficient to support a finding
that that Rosario material might exist, the defense is still not
allowed to personally inspect law enforcement's or the prosecu-
tor's files.180 It is the court's task to review the prosecutor's case
file in camera.'8 ' Furthermore, it is one thing for a court to hold
that the prosecutor's case file can be inspected, but quite an-
other for a court to hold that the prosecutor's filing systems and
computers can be inspected. Finally, it is yet another leap for a
court to hold that such an inspection can be performed on law
enforcement's systems.
her at the police precinct."). It should be noted that the fashioning of the sanction
and adverse inference instruction is within the discretion of the trial court. See
Gibbs, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 394; Matarrese, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 618; People v. Martinez,
524 N.E.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. 1988).
178. See, e.g., Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 532-33 (1st Cir.
1996) (citing confidential nature of proprietary or privileged information).
179. See People v. Poole, 397 N.E.2d 697, 700 (N.Y. 1979).
180. Id.; see also People v. Jackson, 585 N.E.2d 795, 799 (N.Y. 1995); People v.
Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y. 1986).
181. Poole, 397 N.E.2d at 700.
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Accordingly, the Giraldo court failed to reject the defense's
attempt to obtain discovery of the police witness' computer disk
with the definitiveness that was warranted. 8 2 Although
Giraldo did not request an on-site inspection, he did request to
examine the storage medium personally. 8 3 In theory, the
floppy disk could have contained confidential information,
which the defendant could have discovered through forensic
analysis. Defense attorneys will seek similar discovery in the
future, and will seek to examine entire computer systems in-
stead of mere floppy disks. It is clear that a court would deny
an analogous request to examine conventional storage media,
e.g., file cabinets, as there is no precedent for allowing a defen-
dant to personally inspect police department or prosecution's
files. Courts need to recognize that this type of request is com-
pletely unprecedented, as well as recognize the overwhelming
harm that could arise if defendants were allowed to conduct dis-
covery of computer storage media. In sum, law enforcement's
computer systems should be no more discoverable than the pa-
per-based systems that they are supplementing and replacing.
D. Proposed Rules Regarding Rosario Material
The following proposed definitions would remedy New
York's current problems with the duplicative equivalent doc-
trine. The first proposal addresses the fact that New York has
not defined what constitutes a writing or recording, and thus
should adopt a definition consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The definition provided in Federal Rule of Evidence
1001 is consistent with a finding that computer text is recorded
upon keystroke. 8 4 The other proposed definitions are specifi-
cally aimed at reversing the existing doctrine, and would allow
common sense and fairness to again be considered in the
analysis.
1. Adopt Federal Rule Evidence 1001 as the Definition of
Writing and Recording
Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 provides, in part, the following:
182. See People v. Giraldo, 705 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
183. See id.
184. See supra Part III.A. 1. The definition also does not purport to make any
distinction between writings and recordings.
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(1) Writings and recordings. "Writings" and "recordings" consist
of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by
handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing,
magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other
form of data compilation.
(3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing
or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same
effect by a person executing or issuing it .... If data are stored in
a computer or similar device, any printout or other output reada-
ble by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an
"original." 8 5
2. Create a New Definition of the Duplicative Equivalent
Doctrine
Proposed Definition of a Duplicative Equivalent:
" Recorded statements are duplicative equivalents of each
other if there are no meaningful differences between the
two statements.
" Recorded statements do not have to be identical in order
to be considered duplicative equivalents.
(a) "meaningful differences" include:
" Edits made after the document should be considered
finalized.
" Edits that change the meaning of the document.
" Substantive edits.
(b) "meaningful differences" do not include:
" Minor edits (an edit made shortly after the initial crea-
tion of the document should be presumptively minor).
" Edits made while the document is a work-in-progress.
(c) work-in-progress means:
" A document that has not been finalized.
" A document that is being edited and corrected for accu-
racy and clarity.
" A document that is being added to, through the addition
of new text.
185. FED. R. EVID. 1001.
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3. Proposed Rule to Allow Prosecution Witness'
Testimony Regarding Lost or Destroyed Rosario
Material
" The testimony of the witness who created a document or
other recorded statement may be considered as to
whether prior versions or drafts existed or are exempted
from discovery, including as to whether they are duplica-
tive equivalents.
" The witness may be subjected to cross-examination, and
the testimony may be given whatever weight deemed ap-
propriate and is not presumptively reliable or unreliable.
E. The Rosario Rule and Future Police Technology
Police technology often lags behind the private sector, and
version control software is one area in which police should not
be expected to emulate private sector technology. Such
software is cost-effective for businesses to use because the pri-
vate sector deals with complicated documents with multiple
contributors, and considerable intellectual capital goes into the
product. Police departments, in contrast, deal with reports in
simple word processing documents that are completed by one
person. A police report is a simple factual account, and should
not contain any significant creativity. Thus, it is hardly cost-
effective for police to use such version control software.18 6 Al-
though the purpose of the Rosario rule is to allow the defense to
test the credibility of a prosecution witness, attempting to track
every single change to a document is not the most effective or
efficient way to test credibility. In addition, version control
software should not become a legal standard because that
would unreasonably require all police departments to have the
necessary software.
On the other hand, some police departments will become
increasingly computerized. Officers and investigators will
make more use of laptop or in-car computers, and possibly
PDAs. It will also become more common for data, notes, and
reports to be entered into a computer from the field and trans-
ferred electronically into a centralized database. Moreover, as
186. Cost-effective, in this instance, would reflect a balancing of the financial
and administrative costs with the benefit (if any) to the administration of justice.
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internal paperwork becomes increasingly electronically based,
rather than paper based, agencies will have to ensure that ade-
quate measures are in place to protect the integrity of the
stored data.
IV. Conclusion
The New York Rosario rule's duplicative equivalent doc-
trine has serious shortcomings and must be modified. These
shortcomings are impossible to ignore and are exacerbated
when applied to computer documents. Attempting to conform
police procedures and computer technology to the Rosario rule
is impossible. Rather, proper examination of the problem leads
to the conclusion that the duplicative equivalent doctrine is
hopelessly rigid. It must be broadened for all potential Rosario
material, regardless of how the material was recorded. A fail-
ure to preserve statements that differ only minutely from dis-
closed statements should not give rise to a finding of error. The
prosecution witness should be allowed to testify regarding the
contents of lost or destroyed Rosario material, and trial court
judges must be given the ability to assess the witness' credibil-
ity in order to determine if indeed a Rosario violation has oc-
curred. From there, the judge can fashion an appropriate
remedy, if necessary.
In enacting section 240.75 of the C.P.L., the New York Leg-
islature clearly rejected the rigid rule of Ranghelle that had
been set forth by the New York Court of Appeals. The New
York Court of Appeals is now faced with a clear expression of
legislative intent, coupled with the inescapable problem
presented by computer documents. The court must retreat from
its rigid duplicative equivalent doctrine, and adopt a common-
sense approach. If the court of appeals fails to do so, then the
New York State Assembly and Senate must act and legisla-
tively overrule the harsh and rigid duplicative equivalent
doctrine.
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